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Abstract - This article deals with the achievement of 
safety properties of the output part of the safety-related 
electronic control system (SRECS) and refers to the 
impact of architecture and diagnostic of the SRECS 
output part to the required safety integrity level (SIL) 
SRECS. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Control of so-called safety-critical processes 
requires a particular way in the design of the entire 
control system including sensors, actuators, mutual 
communication between individual parts of the control 
system and HMI (human machine interface). 
Designing of SRESC based on safety PLC is devoted 
e.g. in [1]. It is required to use the components and 
their interconnection to the control system that after a 
failure get into the pre-defined safe state. The safe 
state must be determined on the basis of risk analysis 
for each safety function [2], [3]. 
The result of risk analysis is not only the potential 
risks arising from the controlled process, but also the 
degree of effectiveness with which these risks should 
be eliminated. To express the effectiveness of 
measures against random failures of hardware it is 
used probabilistic approach. In this context, we are 
talking about the integrity of safety against random 
hardware failures and it is expressed by the dangerous 
failure rate [4]. 
View of the fact that the control system can 
perform more safety functions and also with them the 
conventional control functions, so that the dangerous 
failure rate cannot be related to the whole system, but 
must be always related to the particular safety 
function. 
Therefore, the efforts of manufacturers of the 
control systems for implementation of the safety 
functions are creating (and subsequently offering to 
customers) as much as possible standardized solutions 
for the same type safety functions (some standardized 
solutions are given in [5]). Ensuring the required 
safety integrity of the safety function (or functions) 
also entails certain economic claims, which do not 
provide users direct economic return (giving him a 
sense of safety, which can be very difficult financial 
rate). Such solutions are profitable in many cases 
because it saves money spent on the design, 
implementation and safety analysis of implemented 
safety function. However, this is not valid always. 
This article points out that the design for 
customized solutions is more preferably for particular 
application in some cases. This solution may take into 
consideration the specifics of given application and 
fmally may lead to a simpler and economically more 
preferred to obtain the required safety integrity level. 
Among the specifics standardized solutions that aren't 
often taken under consideration include for example: 
required SIL, the required response time of the safety 
function, maximum intervals of changes the state of 
the output circuits etc. 
II. SAFETY ASSESSMENT OF A SAFETY 
FUNCTIONS 
Suppose the safety function which is realized by n 
components (e.g. sensors, control logic, actuators, 
etc.). If these parts are connected such that their 
impact on the dangerous failure of the safety function 
can be described by serial model, then dangerous 
failure rate of the safety function can be expressed by 
the formula: 
(1) 
where it? is the dangerous failure rate of the i-th part 
participating at the performance of the safety function. 
Equation (1) is valid provided that the dangerous 
failure of any part may cause a dangerous failure of 
realized safety functions. The control system can also 
perform more safety functions where one part may 
also participate in the performance of several safety 
functions. The issue of the relationship between the 
dangerous failure rate of safety functions and 
dangerous failures rate of individual parts is devoted 
[6]. 
From equation (1) follows directly that the 
resulting dangerous failure rate of the safety function 
is determined by the dangerous failures rate of the 
individual parts realized the safety function. Assume 
that the safety function is realized by the parts of the 
SRECS according to Fig.I. Each part can consist of 
one or several components (e.g. in fig. 1, the input 
section consists of sensors (S) and the input interface 
(II), output section consists of output interface (01) 
and actuators (A)). Then the dangerous failure rate of 
the safety function can be affected especially at the 
input and output of the SRECS, because the other 
components are typically pre-prepared and typically 
certified by the manufacturer for SIL 3 according to 
[4] (e.g. the control logic; SIL3 represents in common 
industrial applications the highest required SIL). 
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Figure I. Basic SRECS components 
A part of the SRECS components manufacturer's 
information is the dangerous failure rate of such a 
components and conditions of usage of component. 
Parameter setting extends the possibilities of 
component usage and must take into account the 
characteristics of the other parts of the SRECS if this 
component is configurable. Components of a modular 
safety PLC can be as examples of components suitable 
for the implementation to SRECS especially for 
industrial applications. The impact of parameters of 
safety PLC to the safety integrity of the safety function 
is discussed in detail in [7]. 
III. INPUT -OUTPUT INTERFACE OF SRECS 
In the terms of achievement of the required SIL we 
need to pay attention to safety function especially to 
input and output of the SRECS as already follows 
from the foregoing. The next part of this paper will be 
focused only on the safety properties of different 
architectures of SRECS output interface, because it 
directly affects the safety properties of output part of 
SRECS. 
A. Commonly used wiring of SRECS output interface 
Fig. 2 shows a commonly used output interface 
wiring of SRECS. This is a two-channel connection of 
power components (in this case contactors) controlling 
the actuator. This wiring is appropriate, on the 
assumption that: 
• safe state of controlled process can be 
achieved by disconnecting the actuator (A) 
from the power source; 
• SRECS outputs, controlling the C 1 and C2 are 
mutually independent (from the perspective of 
common causing failures); 
• SRECS includes the application logic and 
controlling an output Oland 02 at the same 
time, or also diagnostic applications for the 
evaluation of feedback signals. 
The dangerous failures rate of the SRECS output 
interface can be calculated from the equation: 
Pg ct) 
AD(t) - dt 
o I-Pf]Ct), (2) 
where Pg(t) is the probability of dangerous failure of 
output interface. Relation (2) is valid on the 
assumption that Pg (t) has the characteristics of the 
distribution function, which is fulfilled in this case. 
Probability of dangerous failure of the SRECS 
output interface according to fig. 2 can be expressed 
by the following formula: 
(3) 
where Pcl (t) and PC2 (t) are failure probability of 
contactors Cl and C2. 
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Figure 2. Commonly used output interface wiring of SRECS 
Realistically can be assuming that the failure 
of connecting wires and connectors between logic and 
contactors C 1, C2 have no impact on the probability of 
failure of SRECS output interface. 
Based on formulas (2) and (3) and assuming the 
exponential distribution of failures, an equation can be 
derive for dangerous failures rate of the SRECS output 
interface with two contactors: 
Ag1 (t) � 
ACle-AC1 t+Acze-Aczt-CACl +Acz)e-(ACl Hcz)t (4) 
e AClt+e Aczt_e (AC1+ACZ)t 
where, ACl is the failures rate of contactor C 1 and AC2 
is the failures rate of contactor C2. 
The dangerous failures rate of the SRECS output 
interface is time dependent. Provided that there is no 
diagnosis of sensors, it must be considered to 
determine the value of rate with time of the proof test 
and at the extreme case it must be considered with the 
time of the system working life. A significant 
reduction of the dangerous failures rate of SRECS 
output interface may be achieved by implementing the 
diagnostics. If the output interface is made by 
contactors, the diagnosis can be realized by scanning 
the state of the contactor via the auxiliary switch (this 
feedback is shown in fig. 2). The auxiliary contacts 
must be "so called" mirror contacts (the properties of 
such contacts are defmed by the standard [8]). We may 
expect 100% diagnostic coverage provided the correct 
connection of auxiliary contacts on the SRECS input 
interface. In this case, in equation (4), we can presume 
a time of failure detection and negation (disconnect 
actuator from the power source). In general, the 
auxiliary contacts may be connected in series and 
connected to one input or can be connected to 
independent inputs alone. Connection type of auxiliary 
contacts depends on the requirements of diagnostic. 
More detailed information about diagnostics can be 
found in [9]. 
Fault detection of the contactors can be realized by 
functional diagnosis or test diagnosis. In the case of 
realization the functional diagnostics for the fault 
detection time can be considered the maximum time 
between operating commands to change the status of 
contactors. For the fault detection time can be 
considered the maximum time between the 
implementation of testing procedures in the case of 
realization the test diagnostics. 
Within a realization of the functional diagnosis is 
necessary to consider that the operating commands for 
changing the state of contactors are sporadic in 
generally (safety function solves critical situations 
which we are trying to avoid). 
Among a general prerequisite for realization of 
application test diagnostic belongs: 
• possibility to create the user application 
program triggered at a regular intervals (these 
intervals must be guaranteed in order to 
exclude potential threat of interval extension); 
• realization of the test procedure must not 
affect so the actuator to cause an adverse 
reaction in a controlled process. 
If the functional diagnostic or diagnostic test 
execution of SRECS output interface is impossible and 
the reduction of the dangerous failures is necessary, 
you can use one of the following options (or its 
combinations): 
• use the better quality contactors (with lower 
failure rate); 
• ensure the testing by organizational measures 
(e.g. the periodic exchange of contactors and 
diagnostics out of operation); 
• use a more complex structure of the SRECS 
output interface. 
B. The SRECS output interface wiring with three 
contactors 
Fig. 3. shown a SRECS output interface with three 
contactor. This wiring is appropriate under the same 
assumptions as the wiring in Fig. 2, except that three 
mutually independent outputs for the contactor 
controls are necessary (from the perspective of the 
common causing failures). 
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Figure 3. The wiring of the SRECS output interface with three 
contactors 
Fig. 3 shows the wiring without the feedback. If a 
feedback is necessary it can be realized using auxiliary 
contactors contacts. 
Probability of dangerous failure of a SRECS 
output interface with three contactors (Fig. 3) can be 
expressed by the formula 
(5) 
The dangerous failures rate of the SRECS output 
interface with three contactors, assuming an 
exponential distribution of failures occurrence, will be: 
(6) 
where Acis the contactor failures rate. To simplify the 
formula (6) we assume that AC = ACl = AC2 = AC3. 
C. The SRECS output interface connections with four 
contactors 
Fig. 4 shows a wiring of a SRECS output interface 
with four contactors. To contactors control required 
four mutually independent outputs in this case (from 
the perspective of the common causing failures). 
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Figure 4. The wiring of the SRECS output interface with three 
contactors 
Probability of dangerous failure of a SRECS 
output interface with four contactors (Fig. 4) can be 
expressed by the formula: 
Pg (t) � Pcl (t). PC2 (t). PC3 (t). PC4 (t). (7) 
The dangerous failures rate of the SRECS output 
interface with four contactors, assuming an 
exponential distribution of failures occurrence, will be: 
Ag3(t) � 
4Ace-ACt-12Ace-2Act+12Ace-3Act-4Ace-4Act (8) 
4e Act-6e 2Act+4e 3Act_e 4Act 
it is valid that AC = ACl = AC2 = AC3 = AC4. 
IV. THE COMPARISON OF INTRODUCED WIRING OF 
THE OUTPUT SRECS INTERFACE 
The Fig. 5 shows the time behaviors of dangerous 
failures intensity of the SRECS output interface 
according to Fig. 2 (curve I), according to Fig. 3 
(curve 2) and according to Fig. 4 (the curve 3). These 
curves are built assuming that AC = ACl = AC2 = 
AC3 = AC4 = 1. 10-5. 
From Fig. 5 we can see that in the case of 
connection with three contactors (curve 2) or four 
contactors (curve 3), the failure detection and negation 
time to achieve the same SIL than in connection with a 
two contactors (curve 1) is significantly extended. For 
example, to achieve SIL 3 with connection of two 
contactors is needed to consider for failure detection 
and negation time up to 500 hours (about 21 days), but 
in connection with four contactors this time is up to 
15,400 hours (about 1.75 years). 
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Figure 5. The dangerous failure rate of a SRECS output interfaces 
(I - according to Fig. 2,2 - according to Fig. 3,3 - according to 
Fig. 4) 
Necessary prerequisites for the realization of the 
application diagnostic of the output SRECS interfaces 
are as follows: 
• use contactors with so-called mirror contacts 
(standard [8]); 
• enough of SRECS outputs for connecting the 
contactors and enough SRECS inputs for 
sensing contactors state; 
• SRECS allowing running the application 
program of test procedure in the required 
interval (in the case of diagnostic test 
realization); 
• operational changes of contactors state shorter 
than the maximum interval for failure 
detecting and negation established with 
respect to the required SIL (for the 
implementation of functional diagnostics). 
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Figure 6. The dangerous failures rate of SRECS output interface 
according to Fig. 2 
The relatively low dangerous failures rate of 
SRECS output interface can be also achieved with two 
contactors wiring by realization of functional or 
application diagnostic test, if these conditions are 
fulfilled. In Fig. 6 there is shown the curve of the 
dangerous failures rate of SRECS output interface 
connected according to Fig. 2, depending on the time 
of failure detection and negation. Curve is made 
provided that AC = ACl = AC2 = 1. 10-5. Fig. 6 shows 
the range of dangerous failure rate defmed for each 
SIL levels according to [4]. 
If the previously mentioned criteria for realization 
of the application diagnostic is problematic, then the 
output interface with three contactors may be used 
(Fig. 3), possibly with four contactors (Fig. 4). As we 
can see from the Fig. 5, in this case a maximum 
interval of failure detection and negation is 
substantially extended, which will allow us perform 
the diagnostics of contactors e.g. by the periodic 
maintenance of the system (e.g. once a year). In some 
cases (depending on of used contactors and the 
required SIL) the time of failure detection and 
negation can be identify with the planned working life 
of the system. In this case the contactors not need to 
have a mirrored contacts fulfilling the conditions of 
the standard [8] and we do not need more consider 
with the inputs for sensing the state of the contactors. 
On the other side, we need more independent outputs 
(from the perspective to common causing failures). 
V. CONCLUSION 
The SRECS consists of several parts as was noted 
in the introduction. Achieving the desired level of 
dangerous failures for the SRECS output interface is a 
prerequisite to achieve the required SIL of entire 
SRECS. However, we must also deal with the 
dangerous failures rate of other parts. The 
considerations set out in this article can be applied to 
achieving the desired safety properties of the sensors. 
It would be appropriate to deal with the reliabilities 
characteristics of SRECS for the purpose of a 
comprehensive view to the system, but it has already 
beyond the scope of this paper. A comparison of 
reliability and safety features of some SRECS 
architecture with safety PLC can be found in [10]. 
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